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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by plaintiffs from a final judg-
ment dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for failure to comply 
with an Order compelling deposit of security deposits. 
FACTS OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION 
IN THE LOWER COURT 
Because this appeal is on a pre-trial motion deal-
ing with the provisions of Rule 67 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the facts on appeal are essentially the facts re-
lating to the disposition of the relevant pre-trial motions 
in the lower court. 
Globe Leasing Corporation, a Utah Corporation, and 
Bank of Salt Lake, a Utah Corporation, entered into an agree-
ment July 17, 1973, whereby Bank of Salt Lake would selec-
tively finance some or all of Globe Leasing1s lease agree-
ments. It was agreed that this arrangement would continue 
until written notice terminated the arrangement.(File p. 8) 
For purposes of background only, the court should be aware 
that Globe Leasing was in the business of leasing automobiles 
and other vehicles to its customers. (File p. 1) The Bank of 
Salt Lake would finance the purchase of the automobiles and 
Globe Leasing would assign a lease agreement between Globe 
Leasing and its customers to the Bank of Salt Lake as security 
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for the loan made by the Bank to Globe Leasing. (File p. 1) 
As part of the collections Globe Leasing would make from 
its customers, the customers would give Globe Leasing a se-
curity deposit to ensure proper care of the leased vehicle and 
payment of the rentals. (File pp. 145,146). On July 17, 1974, 
Globe Leasing was abruptly notified that the agreement between 
the Bank of Salt Lake and Globe Leasing was terminated. (File 
p. 8) The Bank on July 15, 1974 had written letters to Globe 
Leasing's customers informing them that they no longer were 
to pay Globe Leasing but were now to pay the Bank. On July 
23, 1974, Globe Leasing filed its complaint alleging various 
counts of business interference and business slander. (File 
P- 1) 
A temporary restraining order was issued on July 30, 
1974, restraining the Bank of Salt Lake from collecting or 
holding any lease payments. (File p. 19) On the same day, 
defendants filed a motion to dismiss and compel payment of 
funds. (File p. 27) On August 1, 1974, defendants' motions 
were denied because they were not properly presented and de-
fendant Bank of Salt Lake was ordered to collect rental pay-
ments and make a strict accounting. (File p. 35) On that day, 
defendants filed their answer to the complaint. (File p. 36) On 
August 5, 1974, Mr. Weigelt's deposition was taken (File p. 
109) On August 20, 1974, defendants filed a motion to compel 
depositing of security deposits.(File p. 86) On September 4, 
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1974, Norton Parker (a defendant in this case) has his 
deposition taken. On September 12, 1974, defendants1 motion 
to compel deposit of funds is granted. (File p. 224) March 
7, 1975, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs1 
complaint on grounds that the order of September 12, 1974 
is not complied with. (File p. 293) On April 9, 1975, plain-
tiff s are given ten days to deposit security deposits. (File 
p. 300) On April 16, 1975, plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate 
the order to deposit. (File p. 304) Between April 16 and April 
23, 1975, the then counsel for plaintiffs withdrew from the 
case. On April 28, 1975, present counsel entered his appear-
ance for plaintiffs.(File p. 309) During the interim of chang-
ing counsel, on April 23, 1975, an order dismissing the com-
plaint was issued. (File p. 307) Plaintiffs' April 16, 1975 
motion is denied on May 15, 1975 for non-appearance at the 
April 23, 1975 hearing on dismissal. (File p. 313) Plaintiffs 
then filed a motion attacking jurisdiction which was denied 
May 16, 1975, because it was filed after the order dismissing 
the complaint. (File p. 314) On the filing of a verified 
motion by plaintiffs' counsel explaining his reasons for non-
appearance, the court sets the motion to vacate order to de-
posit for hearing on May 21, 1975. (File p. 319) On May 21, 
1975, plaintiffs' motion is denied, (File p. 320) the April 
23, 1975 order is vacated and re-entered as a final judgment 
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against plaintiffs. (File p. 323) Plaintiffs file a 
motion attacking the original September 12, 1974 order to 
deposit security deposits as void for lack of jurisdiction 
and attack the order of dismissal on the same grounds, 
(File p. 325) Plaintiffs1 motion is denied, (File p. 338), 
after it finally got back to Judge Hall for hearing. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The order of May 21, 1975, dismissing plaintiffs1 
complaint should be vacated for lack of jurisdiction, as the 
order of September 12, 1974, compelling deposit of security 
deposits was entered without jurisdiction. The case should 
be remanded to the District Court for trial setting to de-
termine the issues of law and fact in this case. 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION 
TO ISSUE AN ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFFS TO 
DEPOSIT SECURITY DEPOSITS IN THE SUM OF $11,323.47 
BECAUSE THE ORDER WAS ISSUED IN VIOLATION OF RULE 
67 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Appellants contend that the court had no authority 
to issue its order because the requisite fact situation re-
quired by Rule 67 did not exist. 
At the outset, Rule 67 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure must be carefully examined with respect to the facts 
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in this case. The Rule, insofar as it is pertinent to 
this case, reads as follows: 
"When it is admitted by the plead-
ings, or shown upon the examination of a party, 
that he has in his possession or under his con-
trol any money or other thing capable of delivery, 
which, being the subject of litigation, is held 
by him as trustee for another party, or which 
belongs or is due to another party, the court 
may order the same, upon motion, to be deposited 
in court or delivered to such party upon such 
conditions as may be just, subject to the further 
direction of the court . . ." 
It is clear from the very face of the rule that 
five (5) requirements must be met by the fact situation in 
this case before the court can order funds to be deposited. 
Those requirements are: 
1. The party being ordered to deposit 
funds must admit non-ownership by his pleadings or 
upon examination. 
2. The party being ordered to deposit 
must admit that he has the funds in his possession 
or under his control. 
3. The funds must be capable of delivery. 
4. The funds must be "the subject of 
litigation." 
5. The party being ordered to deposit 
must admit that the funds are held in trust by him 
for another party or that the funds belong or are 
due to another party. 
Appellants strenuously contend on appeal, as they did 
to the lower court by memoranda and by oral argument, that 
these prerequisites to the issuance of an order to deposit 
were not met by the facts of this case. In order to make this 
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point completely clear to the court, Appellants will examine 
each of the rules requirements with respect to the facts in 
this case and with respect to case authority interpreting the 
rule. For purposes of continuity requirements, 1 and 5 of 
the rule will be discussed together. 
; A 
AT NO TIME HAVE APPELLANTS ADMITTED THAT 
THE FUNDS IN QUESTION BELONG OR ARE DUE 
TO THE BANK OF SALT LAKE OR TO THE LESSEES 
AND HAVE AFFIRMATIVELY CONTENDED THAT THE 
FUNDS ARE APPELLANTS' PROPERTY AND THAT 
APPELLANTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO USE THOSE 
FUNDS AS THEY WISH UNTIL THE TERMS OF THE 
LEASE ARE COMPLIED WITH. 
It is curious indeed that at oral argument Appellee, 
in the face of the rule's requirement, states, r'That fact is 
evidenced by Mr. Weigelt, president of Globe, by his deposition, 
by Mr. Parker, the president of the banks affidavit, by his 
deposition and by the documents which are before the Court . . • " 
(File p. 345) It is crystal clear from the Rule that any com-
ments or writings, except those by Mr. Weigelt, are irrelevant 
for purposes of admittance of ownership under the rule. It is 
Mr. Weigelt who must admit that the funds do not belong to Globe 
Leasing and at no time has he done so. But since Appellee con-
tends that Mr. Weigelt has admitted its lack of ownership, it 
will be useful to the court to examine Mr. Weigelt1s statement 
as recorded in the file before the Court. 
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During the taking of Mr. Weigelt's deposition, 
the subject of the deposits for security was discussed very 
briefly three times, twice by direct reference and once indi-
rectly. 
The subject first appears at page 5 of his deposition. 
(File p. 113) Counsel for defendant has been asking questions 
about Mr. Weigelt's first marriage with respect to alimony, 
child support and other debts. Mr. Weigelt's then counsel 
challenges the line of questioning. Mr. Kipp, counsel for 
defendant, responds: 
"Yes, I would like to find out 
something about the financial situation of 
the Corporation with respect to the security 
of certain funds we have in dispute; and I 
would think any obligations which they have 
relating to payments of alimony, child sup-
port, mortgages, other debts, would be relevant. 
That's what I intend to ask about." 
The reference to security deposits is vague and in-
definite, but if this reference by Mr. Kipp is taken to be 
an admittance of ownership or trusteeship by Mr. Weigelt, 
Appellants fail to understand what the word admittance means. 
Mr. Weigelt has not uttered a word. 
The subject of security deposits is raised directly 
at pages 37 and 38 of the deposition. (File, pp 145, 146). 
Q. Didn't you also collect a security deposit 
from the lessee? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How much was that? 
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A. I believe in the case of Richter-Robb it's 
probably $150.00. 
Q. And it varied thereafter between what sums? 
A. A high of $250.00, to a low of $100.00. 
Q. What happened to that money? 
A. That money's utilized by the corporation as 
operating capital. 
Q. And it's your position that that money was 
not to be paid to the bank? 
A. It was not, and it is not supposed to be. 
Whatever admittance is made in these statements, it 
is clear, is it not, that Mr. Weigelt directly denies that the 
Bank of Salt Lake has any right to the security deposits. Nor 
does Mr. Weigelt admit to any ownership by the lessees. On the 
contrary, Mr. Weigelt's admittance that the money was spent 
in the course of business lends itself to only one interpreta-
tion, to-wit: that the money belonged to the Corporation for 
the duration of the leases and they were perfectly within their 
right to use the security deposits as operating capital because 
they had a proprietary right, a vested proprietary right to the 
use of the money. In short, these comments as quoted offer no 
compliance with the admittance aspects of Rule 67 on which to 
base an order to deposit funds. 
The subject appears in the deposition one last time 
at page 59. (File p. 167) 
Q. And you've told me that you collected so-called 
security deposits ranging from $100.00 to $250.00, 
and that those sums have been retained by Globe 
Leasing? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A. Correct. 
Read in the context of the rest of the deposition, 
these statements admit only what has already been discussed, 
namely that the money was collected and spent as operating 
capital. From Mr. Weigelt's deposition, there is absolutely 
no compliance with the requirements of Rule 67. 
The subject of security deposits appears twice more 
in the file before the Court. At page 101 of the file, in 
Plaintiffs' Reply to Counterclaim, under Plaintiffs' second 
defense, Plaintiff states: 
1. Plaintiff GLOBE LEASING CORPORATION admits 
that it has received a certain sum of money 
as security but denies that in or in all [sic] 
said security deposits are the property of 
[sic] should be paid over to the defendant 
BANK OF SALT LAKE. 
This reply was submitted on September 6, 1974, just 
seven days before the original order to deposit was granted. 
No compliance with the admittance aspects of Rule 67 appears 
and read in context with Mr. Weigelt's deposition is clearly 
consistent with comments in that deposition. 
At page 222 of the file before the Court in an affidavit 
filed two days before the original order, Plaintiffs denied that 
the Defendant Bank of Salt Lake had any "claim to or interest 
in any lease deposits collected by Globe Leasing Corporation. 
As [sic] agreed at the time of the original agreement. . ." 
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Clearly, Appellants have never admitted that any 
other party had any claim or title to the security deposit 
funds. Quite the contrary is true. Appellants have admitted 
by their statements and by implication that Appellants are 
the only parties that have a right to the use of the funds 
and that their only covenant was to have a sufficient amount 
of money at the end of any particular lease to return the 
deposit that had been given if the terms of the lease were 
complied with. 
That admittance of ownership or trusteeship in 
favor of another party is a crucial requirement of the Rule and 
is the subject of many cases interpreting Rule 67. 
in In re Elias, 25 Cal. Rptr. 739, 209 C. App. 2d 262 
(1962), the issue on appeal was the same as in the instant case. 
It was alleged that the lower court was without jurisdiction 
to issue the order to deposit. In interpreting a rule, the 
exact duplicate of the Utah Rule, and after an extensive re-
view of the authorities, the court said: 
"As we have seen, there is no admission 
by Harry Elias in any pleading filed up to date 
that any sum is owed by him to the plaintiff or 
to any other person; both he and the surety com-
pany deny any indebtedness on his part; and it 
has not been proven that any such sum is in fact 
due because the trial has not yet been held." 
(25 Cal. Rptr. at 745) (Emphasis added.) 
The Court in In re Elias, supra, quotes favorably 
from Ex Parte Casey, 71 Cal. 269, 12 P. 118 at 119: 
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"Section 572, of the Code of 
Civil Procedure, [the exact duplicate of 
Utahfs Rule 67] refers to property which 
is, without question, in the hands of a 
trustee as trust property, or which belongs 
to or is due to another. It does not refer 
to that where the party alleged to hold as 
trustee claims title to it in his own right." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Elias, supra, court also cites with agreement 
Burke v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. App. 178, 93 P. 1058 (1907): 
"His answer showed that petitioner 
claimed the right to part of the fund in his 
possession, and the court was without juris-
diction to compel him to surrender to another 
what he claimed to be his property, until there 
had been a judicial determination, upon the 
hearing of all the facts, that he had no right 
to it. To justify the making of the order, the 
admission in the pleadings of having money in 
possession belonging to another must be free 
from any claim thereto." (93 P. at 1060) 
(Emphasis added.) 
To the same effect are Sanborn v. Blankenheim, 
346 111. App. 214, 104 N.E. 2d 573 (1952), Brooks v. Galicia 
Steamship Company, Fla. , 237 So. 2nd 583 (1970), 
HMR Development Corp. v. District Court, 152 Colo. 266, 381 
P. 2d 259 (1963), Bata v. Hill, 35 D. Ch. 184, 113 A. 2d 740 
(1955), City of Philadelphia v. Schofield, 375 Pa. 554, 101 
A. 2d 625 (1954). 
It is clear that Appellants have never once admitted 
and have consistently denied that Appellants owed any money to 
Bank of Salt Lake or that the money was held in a trust fund 
for Lessees. To repeat, Appellants have consistently affirmed 
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their proprietary interest in the money ar.I their right to 
the use of the money. (File p. 223) In short, they assert 
ownership of the money which counsel for defendant disputed 
at oral argument. Even assuming, arguendo, that Appellants 
may be in error as to their belief about the ownership and 
rights to the funds, the cases are clear, that that is a 
decision that mist be made after a iaearing on all the facts. 
The meaning of the word deposit, the effect of that meaning 
under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code* whether or 
not the leases are actual salens or security agreements, the 
effect of those determinations as to the rights of ownership 
and use of the funds, and other obvious ciuestions must be 
decided at trial, not in a summary proceeding« 
Appellants, therefore, submit chat the lower court 
was without jurisdiction to issue the order to deposit based 
on the facts and case law pertinent to the instant case. 
Appellants further submit that to force them to deposit funds 
when the court is without jurisdiction is a denial of proce-
dural due process and the subsequent order of dismissal was 
made in error. 
B ;• 
AT NO TIME HAVE APPELLANTS ADMITTED THAT THE 
FUNDS IN QUESTION ARE UNDER THEIR PRESENT CON-
TROL OR POSSESSION AND THEREFORE THE MONEY IS 
NOT CAPABLE OF DELIVERY AND THE LOWER COURT 
WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO ORDER A DEPOSIT 
OF THE FUNDS UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
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Requirements 2 and 3 of Rule 67 will be treated to-
gether for sake of brevity and to avoid repetition. 
The fact that the money is gone has been raised in 
several cases. 
In Burke v. Superior Court, supra, the court said 
at 93 P. 1059: 
"The court's jurisdiction to make the 
order requiring petitioner to deposit in court the 
sum of $2,050 was, under the provisions of said 
Section [the exact duplicate of Utah's Rule] de-
pendent upon whether or not petitioner by his plead-
ing admitted having in his possession said sum of 
money belonging to the corporation. if he did not 
make such admission, then it would seem clear that 
the court was without jurisdiction to make such order." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Other cases have held the same. Brooks v. Galicia 
Steamship Co., supra, Sanborn v. Blankenheim, supra, In re 
Elias, supra, Firemen's Mut. Benev. flss'n of City of New York 
v. Clifford, 201 App. Div. 315, 194 N.Y.S. 295 (1922), and 
Intra-Mar Shipping (Cuba) S.A« v. John S. Emery & Co., 11 FRD 
284 (S.D.N.Y., 1951). In Intra Mar, supra, there was absolute 
proof that the funds in question were spent. The court had 
this to say with respect to that requirement of the Rule calling 
for capability of delivery: 
"It is unnecessary to now determine 
whether defendant became a trustee of the moneys 
it collected. It is clear from plaintiff's af-
fidavits and briefs that the fund in question 
has been spent by defendant and that there is no 
longer any property capable of delivery. It was 
the discovery of this fact on examination of de-
fendant's officers that prompted plaintiff to 
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renew with added vigor this motion, which 
had been previously made and denied. Aside 
from this, we have no unequivocal admission 
on defendant's part that the funds are held 
by it." (Il FRD at 285) (Emphasis added.) 
It is clear from the cases cited and the facts in 
this case that the money is no longer in plaintiffs1 pos-
session and therefore the lower court was without juris-
diction to issue an order to deposit. The clear purpose of 
the rule is to preserve a fund actually xo existence and 
actually controlled by the party ordered to be deposited. 
See all cases previously cited and also Lakewood Trust Co., 
et al., v. Lawshance Co., 100 N.J.E. 572, 136 A. 181 (1927), 
Graysonia, N. & A.R. Co. v. Newberger Cotton Co., 170 Ark. 
1039, 282 S. W. 975 (1926), Robinson v. City of Pine Bluff, 
224 Ark. 791, 271 S.W. 2d 419 (1955). In every case cited, 
the rule interpreted is the same rule that is under discussion 
in this case. When the fund is gone, for whatever reason, the 
order cannot issue. Furthermore, questions and issues presented 
at the beginning of this section must be decided at trial. It 
is also of significance that at oral argument plaintiffs also 
argued that the deposits were worked into the leases so that 
at the end of a lease the deposit could be returned. (File pp. 
348, 355) It is also of significance that if this claim is 
true, which must be proved at trial, it is the Bank who is now 
collecting all the rentals (File p. 35, 57) and, therefore, both 
the Bank and the Lessees are secure in their interests to the 
deposits. 
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The District Court, therefore, was without 
to issue the order to deposit because it lacked the 
tion to do so. 
C 
THE LOWER COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION 
TO ISSUE THE ORDER TO DEPOSIT SECURITY 
DEPOSITS BECAUSE IN ACCEPTING DEFENDANTS' 
THEORY OF THE CASE AT ORAL ARGUMENT IT 
ISSUED THE ORDER IN THE FACE OF DEFENDANTS' 
POSITION THAT THE FUNDS WERE NOT THE SUB-
• JECT OF THE LITIGATION AND EVEN IF THE 
COURT DID NOT ACCEPT DEFENDANTS' THEORY 
AND THE FUNDS ARE THE SUBJECT OF THE LITI-
GATION, THE ORDER CANNOT ISSUE BECAUSE 
TITLE TO THE FUNDS WAS IN DISPUTE. 
Defendants' argument at page 347 of the file before 
the court, contending at lines 4-10 in connection with the 
rest of defendants' statements that this case is distinguish-
able from the authorities cited because the money is not in 
dispute between the litigants, i. e. the fund is not "the 
subject litigation!" The court seems to accept the argument 
and in the face of the rule requiring that the fund being de-
posited be the subject of the litigation allows the order to 
stand! Even more impossible to understand, under the facts in 
this case, is that at the same time Defense counsel argues his 
impossible situation he also implies that if the cases were ap-
plicable, the order cannot stand. 
authority 
jurisdic-
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Defense counsel has made a very unique attempt to 
escape the impact of the rule. It is apparent, first of all, 
from the pleadings, affidavits and motions in this case, that 
at the outset Defendants were claiming the security deposits 
as "their" property," that the funds were "due them" and that 
apparently plaintiffs had assigned all their rights to any 
funds plaintiffs might have collected and that the monies were 
in dispute. (File, pp. 28, 37, 39, 211, 212, 215) It is ap-
parent from defendants1 motions that they were claiming title 
to the funds and in desperation attempted to distinguish the 
cases on a position conflicting with that stated in affidavits 
and motions. But in choosing to use this conflicting position, 
defendants cannot overcome Rule 67. If the money is not in 
dispute between the litigants, the rule does not apply. If 
the money is in dispute as the affidavits, motions and plead-
ings show, then conflicting titles to ownership and rights of 
use cannot be decided under Rule 67 but must be left to trial 
to be resolved by normal judicial proceedings. Clearly, the 
lower court was without jurisdiction to issue the order to 
deposit. 
: D 
SINCE THE COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO 
ISSUE THE ORDER TO DEPOSIT SECURITY DEPOSITS 
IT WAS ALSO WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO DISMISS 
THE PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON AN 
UNAUTHORIZED ORDER. 
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Burke v. Superior Court, supra, and In re Elias, 
supra, both indicate that if the order to deposit is void, 
any other order based on the original void order is also 
invalid. 
- CONCLUSION v 
Based on the pleadings, motions, affidavits and 
depositions of Mr. Weigelt in this case, the order to deposit 
security deposits was void and a nullity because Mr. Weigelt 
did not admit adverse ownership of the funds, possession of 
the funds, control of the funds, that he held them in trust 
for anyone, or any other fact which could have given the court 
jurisdiction to issue the order. To the contrary, Mr. Weigelt 
alleged that the funds were rightfully Globe Leasing's, that 
he could use them in his business, that they were in fact used 
in the business and are no longer capable of delivery for they 
no longer exist. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs-Appellants respectfully submit 
to this court that the order to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint 
and to deposit funds be vacated and that the case be remanded 
to the lower court to be set for trial and a determination of 
the issues of law and fact presented by this case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HATCH, Mc£A£ &7RICHARDSON 
By. Pu^l_ 
Robert M. McRae 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
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